The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets Recognized by UK Firms by Kallapur, Sanjay & Kwan, Sabrina
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Purdue CIBER Working Papers Krannert Graduate School of Management
1-1-2001
The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand




Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Follow this and additional works at: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Kallapur, Sanjay and Kwan, Sabrina, "The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets Recognized by UK Firms" (2001). Purdue
CIBER Working Papers. Paper 18.
http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/ciberwp/18
 The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets  




Purdue University  
And 
University of California, Irvine 
skallapu@uci.edu 




Hong Kong University of Science and Technology 
acskwan@ust.hk 
Phone: (852) 2358-7566 













We thank Ashiq Ali, Mary Barth, Kevin Chen, Kay Stice, T. J. Wong, and seminar 
participants at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and Purdue 
University for useful comments. Sanjay Kallapur thanks the Center for International 




The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets  
Recognized by UK Firms 
 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the value relevance and reliability of brand assets recognized by 33 
UK firms, and the stock price reaction to the announcement of brand capitalization. We 
find that brand assets are value relevant, i.e., associated with market values. However, the 
market capitalization rates of brands of firms with low contracting incentives—firms with 
no transactions that avoided the London Stock Exchange (LSE) rule requiring 
shareholder approval for acquisitions/disposals, and firms with industry-adjusted leverage 
below the sample median—are higher than those of firms with high contracting 
incentives. Thus there could be substantial differences in the extent of bias or error in 
brand valuations of firms with different levels of contracting incentives, i.e., brand asset 
measures might not be reliable. The stock price reaction during the 21 days surrounding 
the first announcement of brand recognition has a significantly positive association with 
the recognized brand amount. However, the brand coefficient is only a small fraction of 
the reaction that would be expected if markets did not impute any value to brands before 
firms recognized them. Few previous value-relevance studies have examined intangible 
assets recognized in financial statements, and none have examined the effects of 
contracting incentives on the reliability of intangible assets.  
 
Key Words: brand assets, intangible assets, contracting incentives, value relevance, and 
reliability. 
 
JEL Classification Codes: M4. 
 




The Value Relevance and Reliability of Brand Assets  
Recognized by UK Firms 
I. Introduction 
Previous studies, including one on brands (Barth et al. 1998b), find that intangible 
assets are value relevant (see Holthausen and Watts, 2001, 21, and their Table 1 which 
lists eight value-relevance studies on intangible assets). The intangible assets examined in 
these studies (except Barth and Clinch, 1998, who examine Australian firms’ revaluations 
of both tangible and intangible assets) were not recognized in the financial statements. 
Rather, the asset measures were constructed by researchers or other outside parties who, 
unlike managers, do not have contracting incentives to bias their valuations.  
Our study adds to the literature by examining the relevance and reliability of 
brands recognized on the balance sheets of 33 UK firms beginning in 1985. Brand asset 
measurement in our sample is subject to managerial discretion—the sample firms 
acquired brands not in isolation but instead as part of a business acquisition, and valued 
them separately from goodwill. We examine three research questions. One, are 
recognized brand asset measures value relevant? Two, do the market capitalization rates 
of brand assets differ for firms that have high and low incentives to bias the recognized 
brand amounts? Three, did the news of brand capitalization convey information to stock 
markets?  
Regressing market values on brand assets, with book values of net non-brand 
assets, net income, and fixed year- and firm-effects as control variables, we find a 
positive (+1.24) and significant (at better than the 1 percent level) coefficient on brand 




firms during the 1984-1998 period. As do previous studies (see Barth et al., 2001), we 
interpret a significant coefficient to mean that managers’ brand valuations are relevant 
and at least to some degree reliable. 
By showing the value relevance of a recognized intangible asset we address one 
of Holthausen and Watts’s (2001) criticisms of existing value-relevance studies that 
examine outsiders’ valuations. They point out that managers have incentives to bias 
recognized amounts because of incentives relating to contracts such as bonus plans, 
compensation based on stock price which could be temporarily affected by managerial 
mis-statements, or debt covenants. Therefore, Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue, an 
asset measure that was value relevant when it was merely disclosed could cease to 
become value relevant when recognized. Contracting incentives are likely to be strong in 
our setting because brand assets are a substantial fraction of net assets: the median firm’s 
brand assets are 44.2 percent of book value of equity (including brands). Also, brand 
accounting was regarded as controversial.1 We find that brands are value-relevant despite 
these reasons to expect that lack of reliability might overwhelm relevance.  
Although value relevance implies that brand asset measures are not totally 
unreliable, we also perform a stronger test of reliability by investigating differences in 
brand capitalization rates of firms with strong and weak contracting incentives. If firms 
with high contracting incentives overvalue brands or introduce greater noise (as 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001, 29, argue) then their brand capitalization rates should be 
                                                 
1Farquhar, Han, and Ijiri (1992) quote a statement by the chairman of Britain’s Accounting Standards 
Committee that brand accounting was the major accounting controversy of the last twenty years.  Smith 
(1996) includes it among controversial accounting practices.  A London Business School study 
commissioned by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (Barwise et al. 1989, 78) 
concludes that the problems facing brand valuation, including subjectivity and lack of precision, are “too 




lower. Predictable differences in valuation biases or noise would suggest a lack of 
consensus, violating verifiability, a component of reliability.2 We base our measures of 
contracting incentives on Mather and Peasnell’s (1991) and Muller’s (1999) findings that 
brand recognition helped firms avoid London Stock Exchange (LSE) rules requiring 
shareholder approval for certain transactions, and reduce their leverage.3 We thus 
partition our sample into subsamples according to (1) whether or not the firm was 
affected by the LSE rule requiring shareholder approval for large acquisitions/disposals, 
and (2) whether the industry-adjusted debt-to-book-equity ratio was above or below the 
median.  
Regressing market values on book values, net incomes, brand assets, the variables 
interacted with a dummy variable based on the LSE rule, and firm- and year-effects, we 
find that the brand coefficients for firms with high and low incentives to overstate brands 
are 0.35 and 1.94 respectively. Similarly, we find that brand coefficients for high- and 
low-leverage firms are 0.40 and 1.91. In each regression the difference between brand 
capitalization rates of firms with low and high incentives (1.94 – 0.35 = 1.59 and 1.91 – 
0.40 = 1.51 respectively) is statistically significant, while the brand coefficient for firms 
with high contracting incentives to overstate brands (0.35 and 0.40 respectively) is 
insignificant. These findings suggest that managers’ discretionary valuations of intangible 
assets recognized in financial statements might not be reliable. However, given the 
                                                 
2 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) 2: Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information (1980) defines verifiability as “the ability through consensus among measurers to ensure that 
information represents what it purports to represent or that the chosen method of measurement has been 
used without error or bias.” Differences in error and bias among different groups of firms would therefore 
signify a lack of verifiability. Besides verifiability, SFAC 2 mentions representational faithfulness and 
neutrality as the other components of reliability. 
3 These studies, however, do not provide any evidence on value relevance or on whether these contracting 





differences in market capitalization rates, the markets do seem capable of seeing through 
the differences in reliability--our findings therefore do not suggest that markets are 
misled by the lack of reliability.  
It is possible on the other hand that markets are misled by non-recognition of 
brands, i.e., they undervalue brand-intensive firms in the absence of disclosure or 
recognition of brand asset values. If so, the news of brand recognition should convey 
information to stock markets. We find that announcements of brand capitalization indeed 
result in positive abnormal returns on average equaling 12 percent of the value of the 
brands deflated by market value. Besides undervaluation, the benefits of relaxing 
contracting constraints can also explain the positive return. Although we attempt to 
distinguish between the two possible explanations by examining difference in abnormal 
returns to firms with high and low contracting incentives, we obtain insignificant 
coefficient differences; this prevents us from drawing any conclusions. Nevertheless, 
undervaluation, if any, is small in magnitude--the 0.12 coefficient is much lower than the 
brand capitalization rate we obtain in our value-relevance regression, 1.24, suggesting 
that most of the brand values had been capitalized into share prices before firms 
recognized them.  
We are not aware of any study that examines the reliability of intangible assets, 
except those that find intangible assets to be value relevant and hence conclude that their 
measures are at least to some degree reliable. In other work on the value relevance of 
discretionary amounts recognized in financial statements, Aboody et al. (1999) examine 
the value relevance of upward revaluations of tangible fixed assets by UK firms, and 




coefficients between high- and low-leverage firms in their study is lower than in our 
sample. A possible explanation for their smaller difference is that we study an intangible 
asset; such assets are generally considered to be more difficult to value (Barth and 
Landsman, 1995) and hence afford managers more discretion. Also, our sample firms’ 
brand assets are a much higher fraction of book values of net assets, for the median firm 
44.2 percent, than are revaluation reserves in Aboody et al.’s (1999) sample (6.5 percent). 
Our finding therefore indicates that large cross-sectional differences in market 
capitalization rates could be observed if valuations are subjective and contracting 
incentives are strong. 
In contributing to the literature on value relevance and reliability of intangible 
assets, and more generally of recognized discretionary amounts, our findings also 
contribute to the policy debate on recognition of intangible assets. An article in Forbes 
(Stewart 2001), for example, opines that the existing accounting system that ignores self-
generated intangible assets is like an octogenarian butler; although faithful, he has “lost 
track of some valuable jewels, paid no attention to the furnace and the water heater, and 
put the place at risk.” The Economist (2001), on the other hand, argues that intangible 
assets cannot be reliably valued, and “soft measures, if required by the authorities, could 
end up being used to hoodwink investors.” Also, responding to suggestions in “hundreds 
of recent articles, studies, and consultants’ reports” (FASB, 2001, 2), in January 2002 the 
FASB added to its agenda a project on disclosure of self-generated intangible assets. The 
proposal (FASB, 2001) states that a secondary goal of the project is to take a step towards 
potential eventual recognition of the intangible assets. While our results should help 




reliability, we do not draw explicit policy conclusions because the trade-off between 
relevance and reliability for standard setting is not precisely quantified (Barth et al. 2001, 
81). Moreover, accounting standards are shaped by factors other than value relevance and 
reliability (Holthausen and Watts, 2001).  
II. Brand Accounting in UK, and Contracting Incentives 
UK company law and Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 14: 
Group Accounts (1978)4 permit companies to recognize acquired as well as self-
generated brands, trademarks and titles. The Companies Act 1985 allows intangible 
assets, including self-generated ones, other than goodwill, to be recognized at “current 
cost” (generally taken to be the lower of replacement cost or realizable value). SSAP 14 
requires that the purchase price of a business acquisition be allocated to tangible assets 
and identifiable intangible assets other than goodwill on the basis of fair value to 
acquiror. Trademarks and publishing titles are cited as examples of identifiable intangible 
assets in the Companies Act 1985, SSAP 14, and SSAP 22: Accounting for Goodwill 
(1984).  
Three of our 33 sample firms capitalized self-generated titles and brands (along 
with other acquired ones),5 but the other firms capitalized only brands obtained as part of 
a business acquisition. In either case managers have discretion in valuation—in the case 
of self-generated brands for determination of replacement costs and realizable values, and 
in the case of acquired brands for determination of fair values. 
                                                 
4 SSAP 14 was superseded by the Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 2: Accounting for subsidiary 
undertakings in 1992. FRS 2 does not change the relevant SSAP 14 provisions about allocation of the 
purchase price.  
5 Rank Hovis McDougall capitalized acquired and self-generated brands when it was subject to a takeover 




Firms had contracting incentives to overstate brand assets in business acquisitions 
because any part of the acquisition price that was not allocated to tangible assets and 
identifiable intangible assets was instead allocated to goodwill (SSAP 22). Unlike in the 
USA, goodwill was immediately written off to owners’ equity. Brands, on the other hand, 
were capitalized. Moreover, firms were not required to amortize brands except in case of 
value impairment. The difference in the treatment of goodwill versus brands gave firms 
an incentive to recognize brands separately from goodwill.6 Overstatement of brand 
assets would reduce the amount of goodwill written off to owners’ equity, and thereby 
reduce the adverse effect on debt-to-book-equity ratios.7 This is an important contracting 
consideration because many UK firms have a provision in their charter prohibiting them 
from borrowing if it increases the debt-to-book-equity ratio beyond a certain limit.8 UK 
banks also consider the debt-to-book-equity ratio in making their lending decisions 
(Citron 1992). 
Another contracting motivation for brand capitalization was to avoid LSE 
constraints on large acquisition and disposal transactions.  LSE listing rules require that 
                                                 
6 In the US, APB Opinion 17: Intangible Assets (1970, paragraph 26, subsequently superceded by SFAS 
142) required identifiable intangible assets to be recognized separately and SFAS 142: Goodwill and Other 
Intangible Assets, (2001, paragraphs B33-B35) requires firms to value separately any intangibles that either 
arise from contractual or other legal rights, or are separable. However, there is no difference in treatment of 
brands versus goodwill—under APB 17 both were capitalized and amortized, and under SFAS 142 both are 
capitalized and need not be amortized, but must be tested for impairment. Also, in December 1997 the UK 
Accounting Standards Board issued Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 10: Goodwill and Intangible 
Assets to replace SSAP 22.  FRS 10 became effective on December 23, 1998. Similar to SFAS 142, it 
removes the distinction between goodwill and identifiable intangible assets by not requiring amortization of 
either kind of intangible asset if it has an indefinite life. From our sample we exclude observations with 
fiscal years ending on or after December 23, 1998.  Thus brand asset measures in our sample are unaffected 
by changes in accounting standards. 
7 Although it recommended an immediate write-off, SSAP 22 (1984, paragraphs 32-35) permitted UK 
companies to capitalize goodwill, as in the USA. Because of the amortization requirement, and consequent 
reduction in future earnings, most companies preferred an immediate write-off. On Compustat Global 
Vantage we find only 155 firm-year observations with a non-zero goodwill asset, out of over 7,900 firm-
year observations of UK firms between 1989 and 1997. 
8 In its 1989 annual report, Cadbury Schweppes plc, one of our sample firms, explicitly cited such a 




companies obtain shareholders’ approval for each “material” acquisition or disposal. 
Although transactions are considered material if any one of five specified ratios9 exceeds 
25 per cent, the binding constraint in the majority of cases is the ratio of total acquisition 
price to the book value of net assets of the acquiring firm (Moorhouse, 1990). Firms 
wishing to avoid the expense and delay associated with a shareholder vote10 in future 
acquisitions or disposals therefore have an incentive to place a higher valuation on brand 
assets rather than goodwill. Because goodwill is written off against equity, a higher 
valuation on brand assets increases the book value of the firm’s net assets; for a given 
amount of acquisition/disposal consideration this reduces the consideration-to-assets ratio 
and permits the firm to undertake larger acquisitions or disposals without seeking 
shareholder approval.11 
                                                 
9 The five ratios are: 
1. The net assets of the acquired/disposed unit (hereafter target) divided by the book value of net 
assets of the acquiring/divesting firm (hereafter parent). 
2. Net profits (before taxation and extraordinary items) attributable to the assets of the target divided 
by those of the parent. 
3. The purchase/sale price divided by the book value of net assets of the parent. 
4. The purchase/sale price divided by the market value of all the common shares of the parent. 
5. The gross capital of the target divided by the gross capital of the parent.  For the parent, gross 
capital is defined as the aggregate value of common shares (at market value immediately prior to 
announcement), preferred shares, debt (at market value, if listed), net current liabilities, and all 
other liabilities such as minority interests and deferred taxes.  For the target, a similar aggregation 
is used except that the amount of the purchase/sale price is used instead of the market value of the 
common shares being acquired.  
10 The expenses include those related to holding an extraordinary general meeting to seek shareholder 
approval, professional advisory fees, and administrative expenses.  For acquisitive companies, book equity 
depletion resulting from goodwill writeoffs means that shareholder approval is required for even small 
acquisitions.  This process causes delay and is a 'deal breaker' in many potential acquisitions (KATO 
Communications, 1993, 143). 
11 A simple numerical example illustrates the benefit. Suppose XYZ company originally has £100 of assets 
and is all-equity financed. It acquires a company for £50 in cash. The tangible assets of the target have a 
fair value of £20. If the £30 (50 – 20) excess is entirely attributed to goodwill, XYZ’s total assets and 
equity will equal £70 (assets = 100 – cash paid, 50 + tangible assets acquired, 20; owners’ equity = 100 – 
goodwill write-off, 30). On the other hand, if £10 of the purchase price is allocated to brands, then goodwill 
would equal £20 (50 – tangible assets, 20 – brands, 10). So total assets and equity will equal £80 (assets = 
100 – cash paid, 50 + tangible assets acquired, 20 + brands, 10; equity = 100 – goodwill write-off, 20). 
Subsequent to the acquisition if XYZ company wants to acquire another company for £18, it will have to 
seek shareholders permission in the first case where no brands were recognized (because 18/70 exceeds 25 




Mather and Peasnell (1991) and Muller (1999) find evidence that both contracting 
considerations motivated firms to capitalize brands.  Muller measures the impact of LSE 
rules on firms by constructing a CLASSTEST variable representing the number of 
transactions that could avoid the LSE shareholder approval rules in the year subsequent 
to the first capitalization of brands.  Although Muller finds in univariate tests that both 
leverage and CLASSTEST are associated with firms’ decisions to capitalize brands, his 
multiple logit regression indicates that CLASSTEST is more significantly associated with 
brand capitalization, than is leverage.  
III. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
Initially we used Extel Company Analysis (one of a family of databases, formerly 
produced by Financial Times, of UK company financials, share prices, and news) to 
identify UK firms reporting intangible assets in excess of 1 percent of total assets. We 
determined the nature of the capitalized intangibles from firms’ annual reports because 
brand values are not separately reported in available databases.12 We include 33 firms 
that capitalized brands or titles (such as newspaper or magazine titles) in our sample.13  
The earliest instance of capitalization (of titles) was by Reed International in 1985.  For 
the tests that follow, we hand-collected brand values from annual reports and obtained 
                                                 
12 For example, Compustat’s Global Vantage data item 82 records the value of all intangibles; no 
breakdown is given except for goodwill (item 93). 
13 Some firms give a single figure, without a break-down, for all intangibles including brands, patents, 
copyrights, licenses, know-how, etc.  We exclude these cases to concentrate on the more controversial 
assets such as brands and titles.  Firms that capitalized brands or titles acquired individually (not as part of 
an acquisition) are also excluded as the valuations are not subject to managers' discretion. Two firms which 
capitalized brands were excluded for the following reasons. At the first balance sheet date, one firm, Mirror 
Group Newspaper plc, was under investigation for serious financial and pension fraud and its shares were 
suspended from trading over an extended period of time. Another firm, SmithKline Beecham, had a 
substantial portion of its equity in the form of overseas equity units and substantial price differences were 
documented between the two equity types (Frost and Pownall, 1996).  The relationship between its market 




stock prices and accounting data from Global Vantage’s 1998 Industrial/Commercial File 
and Issue File, Extel Company Analysis, Extel Company Research, Extel Equity 
Research, and Microview.  
In Table 1 we present a list of the brand-capitalizing firms.  The capitalized 
brands form a substantial percentage of book values of equity for the sample firms--the 
percentage ranges from a low of 1.4 percent to a high of 293.2 percent (median 44.2 
percent).  When brand assets are subtracted from book values of equity, the median 
sample firm’s leverage is 1.95.  It decreases substantially, to 1.16 when we include 
brands in book values.  Market-to-book values of the median sample firms are similarly 
5.19 and 2.50 without and with brands.  Thus the brand assets of the sample firms are 
significant in comparison to book values of equity and debt; sample firms are therefore 
expected to have strong incentives to overvalue brands. 
[Table 1] 
We examined financial statements to determine the sample firms’ policies on 
brand assets (not reported in any table).  The basis of valuation is “cost [at acquisition],” 
“historical cost,” or “fair value on acquisition” in most cases. The remaining firms 
mention “valuation,” “directors’ valuation,” “fair value,” or “use value” as the basis.  
However, very few firms provide details about the methods or assumptions used in the 
valuation. Only three firms amortized the brand assets. Yet brand assets do change over 
time, primarily because of acquisitions and disposals. Descriptive statistics presented in 
Table 2 show that the coefficient of variation of brands exceeds 10 percent for 20 of the 
33 firms. Of the remaining 13, one firm has only a single observation, and six others have 




the number of observations; the six firms with no brand variation have only 20 firm-year 
observations in total.  
[Table 2] 
IV. Research Design and Findings 
Value Relevance of Brand Assets 
 Following previous work (see Barth et al., 2001) we test the value relevance of 
brand assets by regressing market value of equity on year- and firm-effects, book value of 
equity (excluding brands), net income, and brand assets using pooled annual time-series 
and cross-sectional data for all sample firm-years. This regression specification is 
consistent with the model developed by Ohlson (1995), who shows that it is equivalent to 
the discounted dividends model under clean surplus accounting,14 if abnormal earnings 
follow an auto-regressive process. We thus estimate the following regression: 












jj FIRMa + a2 BVEjt + a3 NIjt +  
   a4 BRANDjt + ejt, (1) 
where  
MVE  =  market value of equity, 
YRDUMY =  1 if year = Y, and 0 otherwise, 
FIRMj =  1 for observations pertaining to jth firm, and 0 for others, 
BVE  =  book value of equity (excluding brands), 
NI  =  net income, and  
BRAND  =  brand assets. 
                                                 
14 Although clean surplus does not hold in the UK because goodwill is written off directly to owners’ 
equity, Stark (1997) shows analytically that dirty surplus elements can be tolerated in the Ohlson 
framework if they have no ability to predict future earnings, dividend, or book value. O’Hanlon and Pope 
(1999) show that dirty surplus elements in the UK are not value-relevant, thus making it unlikely that they 
predict future earnings or dividends or book value. The absence of clean surplus is therefore unlikely to 
affect our results. In any case, following previous studies such as Barth et al. (1998a), we do not rely on the 






We use net income after extraordinary items because FRS 3: Reporting Financial 
Performance, effective June 22, 1993, effectively outlawed extraordinary items. Net 
income before extraordinary items is therefore inconsistent before and after 1993.15 A 
significantly positive coefficient a4 indicates that brand assets are associated with market 
values after controlling for book value and net income. As in other value-relevance 
studies, we interpret an association as indicating value relevance and at least some degree 
of reliability (Barth et al., 2001, 81).  
 We include year dummies to control for fixed year-effects, e.g., effects of 
macroeconomic factors on stock prices. If correlated with the independent variables, 
these effects could otherwise bias the regression coefficients. Even if uncorrelated, the 
effects could bias the t-statistics by inducing contemporaneous cross-correlation of 
residuals. Similarly, we include fixed firm effects to control for any omitted variables that 
are firm-specific (i.e., constant over time) and for cross-correlation among residuals for 
the same firm. The use of panel data allows us to include both year- and firm-effects, 
thereby enabling us to mitigate bias in coefficients as well as standard errors.  
  Barth and Kallapur (1996) show that scale effects likely do not bias the 
coefficient of interest in cases such as the present one because BVE and NI are likely 
more highly correlated with scale than is BRAND.  Moreover, they show that in some 
cases deflation worsens bias, so we use undeflated variables in our regression.  We use all 
firm-years beginning with the first year of each firm’s brand capitalization, and ending on 
or before December 22, 1998, the day before the effective date of a new accounting 




of 232 observations.  We delete five outliers identified using the DFBETAS statistic 
proposed by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).16 
   [Table 3] 
 Panel A of Table 3 presents correlations among the dependent and independent 
variables used in the regressions. Although correlations among BVE, NI, and BRAND are 
high and significant, condition indexes in the regression estimation (not reported in the 
table) are below 10 and thus multi-collinearity does not affect regression coefficients 
(Belsley et al., 1980). BRAND is more highly correlated with NI than with BVE; this is 
consistent with some of the brand value being reflected in profitability. Results of 
estimating regression equation (1) presented in Panel B of Table 3 show that the 
coefficient on BRAND is positive (+1.24) and significant at better than the 1 percent 
level; brands are thus value relevant despite firms’ incentives to overvalue them.  
  In our specification it is difficult to compare the brand coefficient with that on 
BVE because variation in BVE at the firm level is likely to be low; the fixed firm effects 
might therefore capture much of the effect of BVE. Indeed, if we omit firm effects then 
the coefficient on BVE increases to 0.83 and is significant. Therefore, we do not draw 
conclusions from the insignificance of BVE. The problem is less likely with NI, even 
though the coefficient on NI also is lower than when we drop firm fixed effects.  
 A coefficient value exceeding 1 on BRAND would seem to indicate that firms on 
average understate brands. This is consistent with the fact that the leading brand valuation 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 We also estimated all our regressions using only data for fiscal years ending before June 22, 1993 (119 
observations on 25 firms) and our results were qualitatively unchanged.  
16 In this and subsequent regressions we eliminate observations that have a DFBETAS exceeding 1 in 
absolute value for any regression coefficient.  We also estimate the regressions after deleting observations 
that have DFBETAS exceeding 3/√(nobs), as recommended by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch.  This results in 





method, developed by the consulting firm Interbrand and used by many of our sample 
firms, capitalizes current excess profits using a multiple that is determined based on a 
judgmental assessment of the brand’s strength (Birkin, 1993). Potential profits from 
future sales growth and new products that may be launched under existing brand names 
are ignored in brand valuation, which could result in an understatement of brand values 
relative to those capitalized by the market. A coefficient exceeding 1 on brand assets is 
also consistent with Jennings et al.’s (1996) findings related to goodwill. An alternative 
explanation that we cannot rule out is that the coefficient is affected by correlated omitted 
variables. We believe, however, that omitted variables are less likely because, as 
previously mentioned, we control for omitted variables using fixed year- and firm-effects. 
We also report below that the brand coefficient is largely unchanged when we control for 
the effects of variables such as riskiness, growth, and persistence on NI and BVE.  
 We checked the robustness of our results using several alternative specifications 
described below. First, we perform a randomization test for the purpose of checking 
whether sample firms’ brands and market values are mechanically related given that both 
are large in relation to book values. We regress actual market values on randomly 
generated brand values and the control variables used before--actual year- and firm-
effects, book values, and net income. Consistent with the test’s purpose, we generate 
random brand values such that the distribution of the ratio of random brand values 
divided by the excess of market value over book value (brand ratio) is the same as its 
actual sample distribution. We do this by randomly shuffling the brand ratios and then 
converting randomized brand ratios into random brand values. For example, Reed 




ending on 3/31/1985 are 106.2, 542.9, and 664.2 respectively. Its brand ratio therefore 
equals 106.2/(664.2 - 542.9) = 0.88. Similarly, Grand Metropolitan’s brands, book value, 
and market value for 1988 are 588.3, 2818.7, and 4266.9 respectively. If Reed’s 1985 
brand ratio is randomly assigned to Grand Metropolitan for 1988 then Grand 
Metropolitan’s randomized brand value used instead of its actual brand value in the 
regression is 0.88*(4266.9 – 2818.7) = 1274.4. We perform 100 randomization trials 
using random brand values instead of the actual ones. The randomized p-value (not 
reported in any table) is 0.00; none of the brand coefficients in the randomized 
regressions exceed the actual coefficient. We thus reject the explanation that the 
significance of brands is a mechanical relation. However, because our sample brand 
values are large in relation to book values of equity, our findings may not generalize to 
firms whose brands values are small. 
 Second, previous research finds evidence that the coefficients on BVE and NI vary 
as functions of earnings persistence and riskiness. Variables used to proxy for these 
factors include: persistence of abnormal earnings (estimated in Dechow et al., 1999, 
using an AR(1) model), return on equity (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997), standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns, and size, i.e., book value of total assets (Barth et al., 
1998a). We create a dummy variable partitioning the sample firm-years into two groups 
based on persistence (estimated by an AR(1) model using the time series of each firm’s 
abnormal earnings during the sample period), and re-estimate regression equation (1) 
allowing the intercept and coefficients on BVE and NI to vary with persistence. We 
similarly re-estimate regression equation (1) with dummy variables for each of the other 




above, and their interactions with BVE and NI, jointly included in the regression 
equations.  The coefficient on BRAND is significant in each of these cases at the 1 
percent level or better. Also, the brand coefficient remains above 1—it ranges from 1.12 
to 1.36. Third, we controlled for sales growth rates because brand assets might proxy for 
them—managers and outside appraisers might be more comfortable justifying high brand 
values when sales growth is high. The results remain similar. Overall, the results of the 
sensitivity analysis reinforce the conclusion that brand assets are value relevant. 
Reliability of Brand Assets 
  The value relevance finding indicates that any bias or measurement error in brand 
valuation is not severe enough to eliminate its relevance. Nevertheless, the question of 
whether there are predictable differences in bias and measurement error is likely to be of 
importance to standard setters as these are features of reliability, a desirable characteristic 
of accounting numbers (SFAC 2). To investigate this issue we estimate the market 
capitalization rates of brands (regression coefficient on BRAND) of firms partitioned 
according to whether their contracting incentives were high or low. We interact the 
dummy variables representing contracting incentives with each of the independent 
variables (book value of equity, net income, and brand assets) to allow the coefficients on 
the independent variables to differ according to contracting incentives. We thus estimate 
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MVE  =  market value of equity, 
YRDUMY =  1 if year = Y, and 0 otherwise, 
FIRMj =  1 for observations pertaining to jth firm, and 0 for others, 
BVE  =  book value of equity (excluding brands),  
NI  =  net income, 
BRAND  =  brand assets. 
D_nocltest  =  a dummy variable equaling zero if brand capitalization enabled a 
firm to avoid the LSE rule regarding shareholder approval for one or 
more transactions during the year subsequent to capitalization (i.e., if 
CLASSTEST exceeds zero).  A transaction is considered to have 
avoided the LSE rules if either the assets ratio (ratio of net assets of 
the acquired/disposed entity divided by the net assets of the parent 
firm) or the consideration ratio (net purchase consideration paid or 
received divided by the net assets of the parent firm) exceeds 25 
percent without including brand assets, but both ratios are lower than 
25 percent after including brands.  We exclude any transactions with 
a consideration-to-market-capitalization ratio exceeding 25 percent 
because those transactions would need shareholder approval 
regardless of brand capitalization. Twelve of the 33 sample firms had 
transactions that avoided the LSE rules as a result of brand 
capitalization.17 
D_lolevg =  a dummy variable for industry-adjusted leverage. The dummy equals 
1 if the sample firm’s industry-adjusted leverage in the first year of 
brand capitalization is below the sample median. Industry-adjusted 
leverage is total debt divided by book value of equity (without 
brands) of the sample firm minus median leverage of all firms in the 
same 3- or 4-digit UK SIC code.  For the sake of consistency, we 
exclude intangible assets from book value of equity in calculating 
leverage for firms in the industry group. 
 
Once firms have decided to capitalize brands they apply their chosen accounting 
method consistently in future periods, instead of freshly deciding each period whether to 
capitalize brands. We therefore calculate each contracting-incentives dummy (based on 
CLASSTEST or leverage) at the firm level using information at the time of the first brand 
                                                 
17 Our definition of CLASSTEST differs from Muller’s (1999) in one respect. We count the actual number 
of transactions that could avoid shareholder approval requirements under the LSE rules as a result of brand 
capitalization. Because the amount of acquired brands that could have been recognized is unavailable for 
his control firms, Muller (1999) uses a less accurate measure—he counts the number of transactions with 




capitalization. Therefore all firm-year observations for a given firm j have the same value 
of the contracting-incentives dummy.  
Coefficient b4 (c4) measures the brand assets’ market capitalization rate for firms 
with at least one acquisition/disposal transaction that avoided the LSE rules (high-
leverage firms), and b7 (c7) measures how this rate differs for firms without transactions 
that avoided the LSE rules (low-leverage firms). If there is an upward bias in brand 
measures of firms with greater contracting incentives, then the market capitalization rate 
for those firms’ brands will be lower. In a regression context if an independent variable is 
multiplied by a constant k, (> 1 for high-contracting-incentive firms because of upward 
bias) then the estimated coefficient for that group of firms equals the original coefficient 
divided by k, and hence is smaller.  
In addition to bias, Holthausen and Watts (2001, 29) suggest that managers might 
also introduce noise to mislead auditors and stock markets. Such noise would lead to 
errors in brand measures, which would bias the estimated regression coefficient towards 
zero in a multiple regression if other regressors are measured without error (Garber and 
Klepper, 1980). Because the brand coefficient is expected to be positive, bias towards 
zero implies a smaller coefficient for firms with greater contracting incentives. Thus we 
expect both upward bias and greater error in brand measures to result in a smaller brand 
coefficient.18 Accordingly the brand coefficient for firms with lower contracting 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether these ratios are less than 25 percent after brand recognition. Like us, Muller excludes transactions 
with a consideration-to-market capitalization ratio exceeding 25 percent. 
18 The regression coefficient remains biased towards zero even if other variables are measured with error, 
as long as those errors are small (i.e., have low variance). On the other hand, if the error in measuring other 
variables is large, then the effect of measurement error on the coefficient could be opposite to that of the 




incentives will be higher, and a positive value would be obtained for coefficients b7 and 
c7.  
We include BVE*D_nocltest, and NI*D_nocltest (BVE*D_lolevg, and 
NI*D_lolevg) to ensure that the estimated coefficient on BRAND*D_nocltest 
(BRAND*D_lolevg) is unaffected by any association between stock prices and 
interactions of the contracting proxy with BVE and NI. The firm dummies included in the 
regression are finer than the contracting proxy (whose value depends on whether an 
observation pertains to a firm that is classified into the high- or low-contracting-
incentives group). Therefore we do not include contracting proxies in the regression—
they would be collinear with some of the firm dummies if we did. In addition to the firm 
dummies, as in estimating regression equation (1), we include year dummies to capture 
fixed year effects. The sample, as before, consists of 232 firm-year observations.  In each 
regression (equations 2 and 3) the DFBETAS statistic proposed by Belsley, Kuh, and 
Welsch (1980) results in deletion of two outliers.  
[Table 4] 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the correlations between the contracting dummies and 
the other regression variables. Although the CLASSTEST-based and leverage-based 
dummies are significantly correlated (0.36), the correlation is far from perfect; results 
based on the two proxies are therefore not merely repeated versions of each other. Results 
of estimating regression equations (2) and (3), reported in Panel B of Table 4, show that 
the coefficient on BRAND*D_nocltest (BRAND*D_lolevg) is positive, 1.59 (1.51), and 
significantly different from zero at p < 0.01. The effective number of observations in each 




and 117 respectively for dummies based on CLASSTEST and leverage. The significant 
coefficient indicates that the market’s brand capitalization rate for firms with lower 
contracting incentives to over-state brands (firms with no transactions that escaped the 
LSE requirements, or with low leverage) is higher than that for firms with higher 
contracting incentives. The coefficient on BRAND for firms with transactions that 
avoided the LSE rule (high leverage) is 0.35 (0.40), and these values are not statistically 
significant. The market’s capitalization rates for brand assets of firms with low 
contracting incentives are 1.94 (0.35 + 1.59) and 1.91 (0.40 + 1.51) in regressions (2) and 
(3) respectively. 
The point estimates of the coefficients therefore indicate that the brand 
capitalization rates for firms with lower contracting incentives are five to six times 
(1.94/0.35 = 5.5 and 1.91/040 = 4.8) the capitalization rates of firms with high 
contracting incentives. Thus the differences in brand capitalization rates of firms with 
high and low contracting incentives are statistically as well as economically significant, 
suggesting that brand asset measures might lack reliability. This conclusion is contrary to 
that in Barth and Clinch (1998) who find that discretionary revaluations of intangible 
assets in Australia are as value relevant as are revaluations of tangible assets. They, 
however, do not condition their analysis on contracting incentives—ours is therefore a 
stronger test of reliability. 
Another study, Aboody et al. (1999), finds modest differences in value relevance 
of discretionary revaluations of tangible fixed assets in the UK depending on firms’ debt 
to equity ratio—in regressions with stock price as the dependent variable, they find that 




interacted with the debt to book equity ratio is –0.02. Aboody et al. (1999) use a 
continuous debt to equity ratio measure unlike the dummy we use. Nevertheless, we can 
estimate that the difference between the coefficients of high- and low-leverage firms in 
their sample is definitely below 0.10 (0.02*5)--they report that the debt to book equity 
ratio does not exceed 5 for any firm. The 0.10 coefficient is smaller than in our study 
(1.51) in absolute as well as in relative terms (0.10/0.44 versus 1.51/1.91). One possible 
reason is that we examine the value relevance of an intangible asset; these assets are 
generally considered to be more difficult to value (Barth and Landsman, 1995) and hence 
afford managers more discretion. Second, the median firm’s revaluation reserves are only 
6.5 percent of book values in their sample while the median firm’s brand assets are 44.2 
percent of book values in ours. Our finding therefore adds to the literature by showing 
that large cross-sectional differences in market capitalization rates could be observed if 
valuations are subjective and contracting incentives are strong. 
The coefficients 0.35 and 0.40 on BRAND in regressions (2) and (3) are 
statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This is consistent with lack of reliability 
overwhelming their value relevance. However, because the sample sizes are relatively 
small, we do not draw conclusions from insignificant coefficients.  
One potential problem with the use of the D_nocltest variable is that errors in 
brand valuation could affect whether the firm subsequently avoids the LSE requirements. 
That is, if firms’ brand valuations are unbiased but have some error, firms with positive 
valuation error (over-valuers) will have lower brand capitalization rates (if markets undo 
the effects of the error) and be more likely to avoid the LSE requirements in the future. 




be attributable to valuation errors rather than contracting incentives. The small and 
insignificant correlation between D_nocltest and BRAND (0.03, reported in Panel A of 
Table 4) casts doubt on the validity of this explanation. Nevertheless, in another attempt 
to rule out this explanation19 we use an alternative measure for CLASSTEST, namely 
whether the firm needed shareholder approval for any acquisition during the year prior to 
the date of the balance sheet in which brands were first capitalized. This measure proxies 
for the probability of a firm being subject to the LSE requirements in future, assuming 
that past acquisitions are good indicators of future acquisitions. Specifically we define 
D_nocltest0 = 1 if the firm had no transactions that required shareholder approval under 
the LSE rules during the year ending on the date of the first balance sheet containing 
capitalized brands. The coefficient BRAND*D_nocltest0 remains significant at better than 
the 1 percent level using this alternative specification. 
Our findings regarding the significance of coefficients on BRAND*D_nocltest, 
and BRAND*D_lolevg are largely unaffected when we perform the robustness tests 
described for the unpartitioned sample. There is however, one exception: the 
randomization p-values are 0.15 and 0.14.20 Our finding that brand capitalization rates of 
firms with high and low contracting incentives differ must therefore be interpreted with 
caution. Besides, our findings are based on market capitalization rates and therefore do 
not indicate that markets are misled by the lack of reliability. 
                                                 
19We measure leverage using book value of equity excluding brands; the leverage-based contracting 
incentive measure is therefore unaffected by this problem. 
20 The purpose of the regression equations is to assess whether the brand coefficient differs according to 
contracting incentives. Accordingly for the randomization test we randomly assign firms to D_nocltest = 0 




Stock Price Effects of Brand Recognition 
Although markets may not be misled by lack of reliability, previous evidence 
suggests that markets undervalue intangible-asset-intensive firms in the absence of 
recognition (Aboody and Lev 2000; Chan et al. 2000; Lev et al. 2000, Lev 2001). Lev et 
al. (2000) and Chan et al. (2000) find positive risk-adjusted returns to portfolios of stocks 
of firms with high R&D growth rates and high R&D-to-market-value ratios respectively. 
Aboody and Lev (2000) find that trades by insiders in R&D-intensive firms are three to 
four times as profitable as are trades by insiders in non-R&D-intensive firms, thus 
suggesting greater information asymmetries in R&D-intensive firms.  
In case of brands, undervaluation could result because markets impute 
conservative brand valuations to all firms in the absence of disclosure. Alternatively 
markets could be unbiased on average, and firms whose brands are undervalued could 
selectively resort to brand recognition to signal their true values. In either case, 
undervaluation before recognition is consistent with firms overcoming information 
asymmetries through brand recognition.  
If brands were undervalued before firms recognized them, then news of brand 
recognition must convey positive information to markets. Besides undervaluation, 
positive information content could also be explained by the benefit to firms of having 
relaxed contracting constraints. On the other hand, Smith (1996) considers brand 
capitalization a controversial accounting practice and its use a signal of an underlying 
weakness in the firm’s financial position. If markets interpret brand capitalization as such 





We could estimate the market reaction for only 24 of the 33 sample firms: for six 
firms the earliest announcement was before its stock was publicly traded, for two firms 
the stocks were newly listed and previous returns for estimating the market model are not 
available, and in one other case we could not determine the date of earliest announcement 
of brand values. To determine the market reaction to brand announcements we regress 
market-and-risk-adjusted abnormal returns (estimated using market model betas 
calculated over the 60 days ending 30 days before the event date) on BRAND/MVE. Our 
specification is as follows:  
 ,)/( 1,10 jttjjtjt eMVEBRANDddAR ++= −  (4) 
where 
ARjt  =  announcement period (days -10 to +10)21 abnormal returns for the jth firm 
in year t (estimated as the difference between actual returns and expected 
returns based on market model parameters estimated over the 60 trading 
days ending 30 days before the announcement). 
BRANDjt =  brand assets at the end of year t. 
MVEj,t-1 =  market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
 
[Table 5] 
Results presented in Table 5 show that the coefficient on BRAND/MVE is +0.12 
and significant at better than the 1 percent level.22 The coefficient should equal that on 
BRAND in regression equation (1) if 10 days before news of brand capitalization the 
markets expected zero brand values, and did not receive news about any other variables 
during the 21-day returns accumulation period;23 under these assumptions regression 
                                                 
21 Results for other announcement period such as days –2 to +1 and –5 to +5 were slightly weaker. 
22 A randomization test similar to the one for the value-relevance regression indicates that the coefficient on 
BRAND/MVE is significant at the 4 percent level. We randomly shuffled non-zero BRAND/MVE values, 
keeping all other variables unchanged.  
23 In fact, twelve of the 24 announcements were concurrent with earnings announcements. We conduct 
additional sensitivity tests by adjusting the abnormal returns for earnings levels and changes (following 
Easton and Harris, 1991) in these cases. We determine response coefficients on earnings levels and 




equation (4) can be derived from regression equation (1) by first-differencing and 
deflating by market value. The comparison of coefficients, however, indicates that the 
0.12 coefficient on BRAND/MVE in regression equation (4) is much lower than the 1.24 
coefficient on BRAND in regression equation (1). Thus the market had already capitalized 
all but 10 percent (=0.12/1.24) of the brand values into prices before brands were actually 
capitalized by firms. Thus undervaluation of brands, if any, is small in economic 
magnitude.  
The significantly positive return to news of brand capitalization is consistent with 
either undervaluation or the benefit to firms from relaxing contracting constraints through 
brand capitalization; it is inconsistent with brand recognition being interpreted as a signal 
of weakness. To evaluate the constraint relaxation explanation, we interact BRAND/MVE 
with contracting dummies (D_nocltest or D_lolevg) and include the interaction term in 



























−  (6) 
where all variables are as defined before.  
Results presented in Table 5 show that the coefficients on BRAND/MVE * 
D_nocltest and BRAND/MVE * D_lolevg, 0.21 and -0.00 do not differ significantly from 
zero; the contracting constraint relaxation explanation predicts positive coefficients. 
Because of their insignificance we are unable to distinguish between the two possible 
explanations for positive returns at the announcement of brand capitalization. Thus we 
                                                                                                                                                 




cannot rule out undervaluation of brands, but as argued above, the magnitude of 
undervaluation is small. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This study examines the value relevance and reliability of brand assets recognized 
by 33 UK firms beginning in 1985. Most previous studies on the value relevance of 
intangible assets have examined valuations of outside parties rather than managers who 
could be subject to contracting incentives to bias recognized amounts. The only other 
study that examines recognized intangible assets, Barth and Clinch (1998), does not 
examine the effects of contracting incentives on value relevance. Also, previous studies 
on brand recognition in the UK (e.g., Muller, 1999) have examined the incentives for 
brand recognition, but not the effects of these incentives on the value relevance and 
reliability of the recognized brand values. 
Our results suggest that recognized brand values are value relevant despite 
managers’ incentives to over-value them. These findings are robust to several sensitivity 
tests. However, market capitalization rates of brands of firms with low contracting 
incentives--firms with no transactions that avoided the LSE rules requiring shareholder 
approval for acquisitions/disposals, and firms with industry-adjusted leverage below the 
sample median--are substantially higher than those of firms with high contracting 
incentives. The difference in market capitalization rates indicates differences in the 
amount of bias or error in brand valuations of different groups of firms, suggesting that 
brand asset measures lack reliability. These results must however be interpreted with 
                                                                                                                                                 




caution because in a randomization test we perform for sensitivity analysis, the 
differences are significant at only the 15 and 14 percent levels. Another caveat is that our 
findings are based on market capitalization rates; they therefore do not indicate that 
markets are misled by the lack of reliability. 
Previous studies that investigate the effects of contracting incentives on the value 
relevance of managers’ discretionary valuations, e.g., Aboody et al. (1999), which 
examines managers’ revaluations of tangible fixed assets, find much smaller differences 
in capitalization rates. Brand assets in our sample are higher as a proportion of total assets 
than is the revaluation balance in Aboody et al.’s sample. Besides, valuation of intangible 
assets like brands is likely subject to greater discretion. Subject to caveats mentioned 
before, our study therefore contributes to the literature by showing that substantial 
differences in market capitalization rates of recognized assets could be observed for 
different groups of firms when contracting incentives are strong, and the valuations are 
subjective.  
We also find a significantly positive association between market returns during 
the 21-day period surrounding the first announcement of brand asset values. The positive 
association could result either from undervaluation of brands by markets prior to 
recognition, as suggested by Lev (2001), or from the relaxation of contracting constraints. 
Although we attempt to distinguish between the two explanations for a positive 
association, insignificant coefficients prevent us from doing so. We are thus unable to 
rule out the undervaluation explanation, but the magnitude of undervaluation is small.  
By examining the value relevance and reliability of intangible assets, our evidence 




draw any policy conclusions because our evidence suggests relevance as well as a 
possible lack of reliability, and the trade-off between these considerations is not precisely 
quantified (Barth et al., 2001). Besides, accounting standards are shaped by factors other 
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Descriptive Statistics for UK Firms Capitalizing Brands 
Earliest Brand Capitalization and Debt to Book Equity and Market to Book Ratios 

















Reed International 3/31/85 16.4% 1.27 1.06 1.22 1.02 
United Newspapers 12/31/85 98.2% 130.96 2.42 160.88 2.97 
Reckitt and Colman 1/4/86 14.5% 1.10 0.94 2.93 2.50 
Emap 4/5/86 17.6% 1.00 0.82 4.60 3.79 
London International 3/31/88 44.2% 6.04 3.37 8.38 4.68 
Adscene Group 5/28/88 60.1% 4.42 1.76 9.02 3.60 
Ranks Hovis McDougall 9/3/88 73.0% 2.79 0.75 5.19 1.40 
Grand Metropolitan 9/30/88 17.3% 0.87 0.72 1.51 1.25 
Lonrho 9/30/88 10.0% 1.73 1.56 1.48 1.33 
Guinness 12/31/88 48.2% 1.29 0.67 2.01 1.04 
Ladbroke 12/31/88 13.9% 0.79 0.68 1.07 0.92 
United Biscuits 12/31/88 20.7% 1.89 1.50 2.96 2.34 
WPP 12/31/88 293.2% (5.32) 10.28 (1.92) 3.71 
Nu Swift 12/31/88 35.7% 10.47 6.73 9.94 6.39 
Sterling Publishing  3/31/89 58.5% 6.65 2.76 16.74 6.95 
Continuous Stationery 3/31/89 82.3% 7.93 1.40 16.54 2.93 
Southnews 4/1/89 70.6% 4.00 1.17 19.99 5.87 
Goodhead  5/31/89 37.5% 1.95 1.22 2.23 1.39 
Daily Mail & General Trust 9/30/89 47.7% 3.42 1.79 3.43 1.79
Cadbury Schweppes 12/30/89 51.6% 5.33 2.58 8.47 4.09 
Jeyes Group  12/30/89 1.4% 1.16 1.14 2.77 2.73 
Trinity International 12/29/90 18.3% 0.98 0.80 2.23 1.82 
Blacks Leisure 2/29/92 5.0% 1.34 1.27 2.28 2.16 
Telegraph 12/31/92 54.8% 0.59 0.27 3.19 1.44 
Matthew Clark 4/30/93 37.6% 0.65 0.40 2.52 1.57 
Midland Indep. Newspapers 12/31/94 90.5% 5.28 0.50 14.95 1.42 
Dalgety 6/30/95 43.0% 6.97 3.97 7.36 4.19 
Johnston Press 12/31/95 43.7% 2.34 1.32 10.05 5.65 
Highland Distilleries 8/31/96 31.1% 1.50 1.03 3.29 2.26 
Scottish Radio Holdings 9/30/96 55.6% 1.67 0.74 10.86 4.82 
Scottish Media Group 12/31/96 61.4% 1.76 0.68 11.61 4.48 
Charterhouse Comm. 5/31/97 131.8% (2.44) 0.77 (5.48) 1.74 
Newsquest 12/31/97 156.7% (2.04) 1.16 (4.56) 2.59 
MEDIAN  44.2% 1.95b 1.16 5.19b 2.50 





Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
D/E = Debt/Equity ratio = Total Liabilities / Book Value of Shareholders’ Equity  
MVE  = Market value of shareholders’ equity 
BVE = Book value of shareholders’ equity (including brands, except where noted otherwise). 
 
a For six firms share prices are not available at the date of the first balance sheet containing 
brand assets, because, e.g., they were not publicly listed at the time.  For these firms we 
report the first balance sheet date with available share price information.  
 
b Firms with negative leverage or MVE/BVE are treated as having the highest leverage or 
MVE/BVE.  
 







Number of Observations, and Mean, Standard Deviation, and Variation in Brand Values 
by Firm 
 
  Brand Value 
Firm Name N Mean SD CV % Min Max
Emap  13 181.2 172.1 95.0 5.5 479.7
Reckitt and Colman  13 615.0 470.9 76.6 55.8 1295.6
United Newspapers 13 121.8 27.4 22.5 60.0 133.0
Adscene Group  11 16.7 15.3 91.8 2.7 40.0
Southnews  10 14.6 21.5 147.2 2.6 72.5
Sterling Publishing 10 15.4 11.3 73.1 1.8 30.7
United Biscuits 10 174.1 53.4 30.7 106.5 251.0
Daily Mail 10 200.3 35.6 17.8 174.4 260.7
Ladbroke Group  10 326.7 52.7 16.1 276.7 376.7
London International 10 35.6 3.4 9.5 32.0 40.4
Cadbury Schweppes  9 798.1 611.7 76.6 304.0 1689.0
Grand Metropolitan 9 2660.4 965.1 36.3 588.3 3884.0
Jeyes Group  9 0.5 0.2 32.0 0.2 0.7
Goodhead Group  9 11.2 3.0 26.5 6.2 16.0
WPP  9 330.6 58.3 17.6 175.0 350.0
Guinness 9 1388.3 10.0 0.7 1375.0 1395.0
Trinity  8 127.4 141.4 111.0 10.2 354.0
Reed International 8 844.3 648.4 76.8 106.2 1669.7
Matthew Clark  6 9.7 0.0 0.1 9.7 9.7
Ranks Hovis McDougall 5 614.6 105.7 17.2 459.0 740.0
Nu Swift  5 9.5 1.0 10.2 8.5 10.4
Blacks Leisure 4 0.8 0.1 7.2 0.7 0.8
Continuous Stationery 4 4.5 0.0 0.0 4.5 4.5
Lonrho  4 117.0 0.0 0.0 117.0 117.0
Telegraph 4 176.0 0.0 0.0 176.0 176.0
Johnston Press  3 142.5 110.6 77.6 14.9 206.3
Midland Independent 3 112.8 12.7 11.3 99.4 124.7
Scottish Radio Holdings 3 10.9 1.0 9.5 10.2 12.1
Dalgety  3 130.0 0.0 0.0 130.0 130.0
Highland Distillers 3 72.2 0.0 0.0 72.2 72.2
Charterhouse 2 6.4 0.2 2.9 6.2 6.5
Scottish Media Group 2 56.0 0.0 0.0 56.0 56.0
Newsquest  1 320.0  320.0 320.0
 
N = Number of observations, 
SD = Standard deviation, and 






 Table 3 
Test of Value Relevance of Brands 













jj FIRMa + a2 BVEjt + a3 NIjt + a4 BRANDjt + ejt 
 
Panel A: Correlations Among Variables Used in Regressions 
 BVE NI BRAND 
MVE 0.55*** 0.81*** 0.86*** 
BVE  0.50*** 0.23*** 
NI   0.74*** 
 






N = 227 
BVE + -0.06 
  -0.17 
NI + 2.27 
  3.26*** 
BRAND + 1.24 
  3.27*** 
Adj R2  0.96 
 
MVE  = market value of equity. 
BVE  = book value of equity (excluding brands).  
NI  = net income. 
BRAND  = brand assets. 
YRDUMY = 1 if year = Y, and 0 otherwise, 
FIRMj  = 1 for the jth firm, and 0 for others. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (one-tailed for coefficients 
whose signs we predict).   
Five outliers, i.e., observations with DFBETAS exceeding 1 in absolute value for any 






Test of Reliability--Value Relevance of Brands in Subsamples Partitioned by 
Contracting Incentives Dummies  
Correlations, and Coefficient Values and t-statistics for the Regressions: 












jj FIRMb + b2 BVEjt + b3 NIjt +  b4 BRANDjt +  














jj FIRMc + c2 BVEjt + c3 NIjt + c4 BRANDjt + 
c5 BVE*D_lolevgjt + c6 NI*D_lolevgjt + c7 BRAND*D_lolevgjt + ejt   (Model 2) 
Panel A: Correlations Among Variables Used in Regressionsa 
 D_nocltest D_lolevg 
MVE 0.05 0.31*** 
BVE 0.27*** 0.35*** 
NI 0.03 0.26*** 
BRAND 0.03 0.28*** 
D_nocltest  0.36*** 




N = 230 
Model 2 
N = 230 
BVE + -0.42 -0.60 
  (-1.10) (-1.52)* 
NI + 7.19 6.72 
  (5.16)*** (5.25)*** 
BRAND + 0.35 0.40 
  (0.94) (1.05) 
BVE*D_nocltest ? 1.03  
  (1.89)**  
BVE*D_lolevg ?  1.27 
   (2.29)** 
NI*D_nocltest ? -7.96  
  (-5.19)***  
NI*D_lolevg ?  -7.65 
   (-5.45)*** 
BRAND*D_nocltest + 1.59  
  (2.98)***  
BRAND*D_lolevg +  1.51 
   (2.80)*** 
Adj R2  0.96 0.96 




Table 4 (continued) 
 
MVE  = market value of equity. 
BVE  = book value of equity (excluding brands).  
NI  = net income. 
BRAND  = brand assets. 
YRDUMY = 1 if year = Y, and 0 otherwise, 
FIRMj = 1 for jth firm, and 0 for others. 
D_nocltest  = a dummy variable equaling zero if brand capitalization enabled a 
firm to avoid the LSE rule regarding shareholder approval for one or 
more transactions during the year subsequent to capitalization.  A 
transaction is considered to have avoided the LSE rules if either the 
assets ratio (ratio of net assets of the acquired/disposed entity 
divided by the net assets of the parent firm) or the consideration ratio 
(net purchase consideration paid or received divided by the net assets 
of the parent firm) exceeds 25 percent without including brand 
assets, but both ratios are lower than 25 percent after including 
brands.  Any transactions with a consideration-to-market-
capitalization ratio exceeding 25 percent are excluded because those 
transactions would need shareholder approval regardless of brand 
capitalization.  Twelve of the 33 sample firms had transactions that 
avoided the LSE rules as a result of brand capitalization. 
D_lolevg = a dummy variable for industry-adjusted leverage.  The dummy 
equals 1 if the sample firm’s industry-adjusted leverage in the first 
year of brand capitalization is below the sample median. Industry-
adjusted leverage is total debt divided by book value of equity 
(without brands) of the sample firm minus median leverage of all 
firms in the same 3- or 4-digit UK SIC code.  For the sake of 
consistency, intangible assets are excluded from book value of 
equity in calculating leverage for firms in the industry group. 
 
a See panel A of Table 3 for correlations among the other regression variables. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (one-tailed for coefficients 
whose signs we predict).   
In each model two outliers, i.e., observations with DFBETAS exceeding 1 in absolute 






Share Price Reactions to Announcements of Brand Capitalization: All Firms, and 
Subsamples Partitioned by Contracting Incentives 
Coefficient values and t-statistics for the regressions: 



























−  Model 3 
 
  Regression coefficient 
(white t-stat)  
N = 24 
Variable Predicted 
signs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
Intercept ? 0.01 0.02 -0.06 
  (-0.20) (0.62) (-1.36) 
BRAND/MVE +/- 0.12 0.08 0.16 
  (3.21)*** (2.76)*** (3.35)*** 
D_nocltest ?  -0.05  
   (-0.97)  
D_lolevg ?   0.07 
    (1.13) 
BRAND/MVE * D_nocltest +  0.21  
   (1.07)  
BRAND/MVE * D_lolevg +   -0.00 
    (-0.01) 
Adj R2  0.02 0.03 0.08 
 
ARjt  =  announcement period (days -10 to +10) abnormal returns for the jth firm 
in year t (estimated as the difference between actual returns and 
expected returns based on market model parameters estimated over the 
60 trading days ending 30 days before the announcement). 
BRANDjt =  brand assets at the end of year t. 
MVEj,t-1 =  market value of equity at the end of year t-1. 
D_nocltest and D_lolevg are as defined in Table 4. 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. 
 
